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This paper studies implications of intermediation costs in credit markets. The presence of 
intermediation  costs  increases  the  amount  of  risky  projects  therefore  results  in  financial 
fragility. Moreover, for an open economy that has a perfectly liberal capital account, prudent 
firms  finance  their  projects  from  foreign  markets  therefore  shrinking  the  domestic  credit 
markets. The theoretical predictions of our model gains support by Turkish data for the 1991 
– 2004 period. Data suggests that an increase in intermediation costs results in an increase in 
non-performing  loans,  and  an  increase  in  foreign  financing  (shrinking  of  domestic  credit 
markets). We argue that minimization of these costs improves financial soundness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In August 2004, Vice Prime Minister Abdüllatif Şener indicated the concerns for growing 
current  account  deficit  and  blamed  the  acceleration  in  the  consumer  credits  as  the  main 
reason. The immediate “precaution” that was taken by the ministry of finance was to increase 
The Resource Utilization Support Fund (RUSF) on consumer credits by five percent from its 
previous level of 10 percent and eliminate it on commercial credits.
3 The motivation had two 
aspects; one is to reduce the access to consumer credit through increasing the costs of funds 
and the other is the so-called “signaling effect”, where agents are assumed to derive the 
motivation towards reducing current  account deficit! The latter idea develops as follows: 
according to the government the quick growth in consumer credits lead to two end-results; 
first  an  increase  in  financial  fragility  by  increasing  risks  associated  with  the  possible 
repudiation  of  consumer  credits  and  second  is  an  increase  in  economic  fragility  through 
worsening of current account deficits. With growing demand for foreign goods, it is natural 
that imports increase and leads to greater deficits on current accounts.  
 
In this study we will not discuss the justification for the policy of the targeting of current 
account deficit, but rather analyze the immediate and direct implications of intermediation 
costs on credit markets.  
 
Financial  intermediation  is  costly;  costs  arise  from  asymmetric  information  between  the 
lender and the borrower. If borrower’s choice of the project can only be known with a noise 
(by the lender) then it is natural for the lender to require a risk premium. Higher willingness to 
pay at a higher risk premium  leads  to an increase in the frequency of choices of riskier 
projects,  which  may  eventually  lead  to  credit  rationing  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss  1981).  The 
presence of asymmetric information in credit contracts also makes it difficult for the lender to 
repatriate the assets of a defaulted firm, which brings about costs in the monitoring process. In 
this  regard,  these  costs  create  a  wedge  between  the  riskless  rate  and  the  cost  of  credit 
(Townsend 1979). 
 
The risk premium in the setting of asymmetric information has important implications on the 
choice of projects and business cycle. Bernanke et al. (1999) argue that an increase in the risk 
                                                
3 RUSF is a non – tax deductions on the use of consumer and investment credit. It is reduced from 3% level to 
0% on commercial credits lines. During the time a further raise of 10% was also in the agenda. During the 
writing of the paper it has not been implemented, yet.   3
premium, which can be resorted to two sources; an endogenously created within the system 
through an increase in the variance of the projects and exogenously introduced by government 
in terms of taxes or by lenders in terms of transaction costs, leads to amplification of the 
business cycle. We call the latter distortion as intermediation costs. 
 
We define intermediation costs as all taxes and costs associated with banking intermediation. 
An increase in these costs induces an increase in the gross cost of borrowing, keeping the 
credit rate constant. These costs bear important implications on aggregate fluctuations. Besci 
et al. (1999) argue that small changes in these costs result in deviation from high to low – 
employment equilibrium and vice versa. In their setting this shift is a result of intertemporal 
substitutability and distortionary due to changes in the relative prices.
4  
 
Our approach is to bring these two lines of literature with a simple model and then test the 
predictions of the model with data. Our model addresses that an increase in the risky projects 
increases the possibility of non – performing loans and consequently leading to an increase in 
foreign financing. Empirical results support these two predictions.  
 
The  next  section  describes  the  environment  that  links  intermediation  costs  to  non  – 
performing loans, which is followed by the theory of financial deepening. In section four the 
extent of the intermediation costs in Turkish banking sector is examined. Section five tests the 
predictions of the theoretical model using Turkish data. Finally, section six concludes. 
 
2. The environment 
 
Our  model  is  of  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)  with  intermediation  costs.  We  also  represent 
variables with time subscript to keep track of the lead – lag relationship between the variables 
that allows us to easily shift to the regression analysis.  
 
Our continuum of firms has a portfolio of investment projects. Firms do not have enough 
resources to finance these projects; therefore they would like to have access to credit markets 
to cover the rest of the costs. Each of these projects can be differentiated according to the risk 
incorporated.  Firms  have  full  information  about  the  risks  of  the  projects,  which  are  not 
                                                
4 The issue is further discussed in the context of capital flows by İmrohoroğlu and Kumar (2004). They examine 
the variation in returns due to intermediation costs and are able to explain why middle-income countries attract 
higher capital flows. This in turn is also linked to the amplification of business cycles.   4
observed  by  lenders  however,  have  a  prior  on  the  distribution.  In an  environment  where 
interest rates are increasing, firms are more inclined to choose riskier projects since these 
involve higher returns in good times. Therefore, given the distribution, banks can deduce the 
risks of the projects by comparing the average return in the market to the one that firms are 
willing to pay.   
 
Let’s denote the average return in credit markets with r* and call it the optimal interest rates 
for banks. In other words in a perfectly competitive banking sector, r* describes the zero 
profit condition. Let’s denote intermediation costs with t, therefore we can decompose the 
optimal interest rate as the real rate of return, r, and the transaction costs. This relationship is 




* r r t = +   (1) 
 
With zero intermediation costs, the optimal interest rate will be equal to the real rate of return. 
Denote the risks of projects with λ and the firm’s net return on a project is G, which is 
unobservable by the bank. Therefore, for a firm and project pair we can write the cumulative 
distribution function with F(G, λ) with an associated probability distribution function f(G, λ). 
Let’s assume that the number of risky projects increase with increasing λ. 
 
When firms borrow, B, with a gross payment (1+r+t), they will default on the project if return 
and the collateral, C, provided is less than the total cost of borrowing.  
 
  (1 ) t t t t t B r t C G + + ≤ +   (2) 
 
Therefore, banks’ net return can be represented as 
 
  [ ]
*
1( , ) min , (1 ) t t t t t t G r G C B r t κ + = + + +   (3) 
 
Equation (3) implies that the net return to the bank is decreasing in intermediation cost. We 
will prove this in two steps. The first step is that for any interest rate with intermediation 
                                                
5 Let’s assume that riskless rate is zero. Also assume that intermediation costs enter into equations additively. 
The predictions of the model will not change due to these assumptions.   5
costs, only those, who choose riskier projects (λ>λ*), are willing to borrow from the bank. 
This is a result of the increase in expected return with increasing risks. Therefore, only riskier 
projects can finance the borrowing costs.  
 
The net return to the borrower is the comparison of the loss of collateral in case of default and 
the payment that will be made if there is no default. Equation (4) displays this tradeoff. 
 
  [ ] 1( , ) max (1 ), t t t t t t G r G B r t C π + = − + + −   (4) 
 
Notice that on aggregate λ* guarantees zero return for borrowers, 
 
 
* * * *
1 0 ( , ) max (1 ), ( , ) 0 t t t t t t r G B r T C dF G λ λ
∞
+   Π = − + + − =   ∫   (5) 
 
The second step is the increase in risks (
* λ ) with intermediation cost. Simply take the partial 
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  (6) 
 
The numerator on the right hand side is positive. The bounds on the integral are found for 
those firms that can pay back their debt. The denominator is positive as a function of chain 
rule. To demonstrate that we need to make use of the assumption that increasing risks lead to 
increases in return from projects. In Equation (4) we showed that net return to the borrower is 
a positive function of the net return to the project. This concludes our second step. 
 
As can be seen by Equation (6), increasing intermediation costs reduces the return to lenders 
and therefore, deteriorates banks’ balance sheets. The reason is with increasing costs only the 
firms with riskier projects are among the pool of firms that will demand credit.  
   6
3. The Theory of Financial Deepening 
 
The immediate impact of increasing intermediation costs is the worsening of the financial 
position of the borrower. As described in the previous section this increase also worsens the 
financial position of the bank. Financial institutions are very well developed to be able to 
offer various borrowing instruments. Therefore, with severe competition in the sector they 
will  offer  the  least  costly  instruments  to  attract  borrowers.  One  alternative  to  domestic 
financing is the foreign borrowing. Financial institutions can avoid the costs incurred by taxes 
by utilizing this alternative.  
 
In our setup lets assume that there are two type of borrowing instruments, domestic, B, which 
includes intermediation taxes and foreign, O, with associated gross rate of returns R and P, 
respectively. These instruments are gross substitutes in lenders’ and borrowers’ portfolios. 
Denote the total credit demand with T, therefore we can represent the cost minimization 
problem of the borrower as follows, 
  
  { } , min B D T RB PO = +   (7) 
 
The demand correspondence to the minimization problem is given below,  
 
 
   then  , 0
   then  0,
T
if R P B O
R
T
if R P B O
P
    ≤ = =        
    > = =    
   
  (8) 
 
If we combine Equation (2) and (7), and denote total credit supply with M we will obtain the 
equilibrium in credit markets. 
 
 







=∫   (9) 
 
Notice that R includes intermediation costs. In the short – run an increase in intermediation 
costs will increase the gross cost of borrowing for domestic financing. This will shift credit 
contracts  from  domestic  to  foreign  financing.  Later  domestic  credit  markets  shrink  and   7
worsen financial deepening. In the long – run arbitrage will require the rates of return for both 
sources of financing are equal.
6 
 
4. Taxes and Other Burden on Intermediation process 
 
Taxes  on  financial  contracts  are  indeed  shocks  to  financial  contracts.  Suppose  a  tax,  on 
intermediation, is levied after both deposit and loan contracts made. This would change the 
tax burden of holders of savings accounts and users of loans, since taxes are paid after interest 
rates accrue.  
 
Turkish banks have always been heavily and frequently taxed, therefore observed various 
shocks in their history (Table 1). Since taxes are calculated as a fraction of interest rates, the 
high and volatile inflation and interest rates lead to shocks with different magnitudes and 
increase in the tax burden. In 2002 total taxes paid due to intermediation process were YTL 
10.9 billion that accounts for five percent of total asset and 30.1 percent of total net worth of 
the banking sector. The decomposition of the burden among the borrowers and lenders is also 
striking. The total payment made by banks was YTL 3.2 billion and depositors paid YTL 7.7 
billion (Türkan et al. 2003).  
 
In Turkey, one can observe three types of taxations in intermediation process. 1) Withholding 
taxes and fees that are levied on depositors (fees were terminated by the end of 2003) 2) 
Indirect  taxes  on  banks  in  terms  of  reserve  and  liquidity  requirements  3)  Banking  and 
insurance transaction taxes and resource utilization support fund fees paid by the borrowers. 
These taxes have significantly raised the spread between net income paid to depositors and 
the cost to the borrowers.  
 
We calculate the total intermediation cost as the sum of the withholding taxes, fees which is a 
percentage  of  the  withholding  tax,  banking  and  insurance  transaction  taxes  (BIT),  and 
resource utilization support fund (RUSF).
7, 8 The cost variable which is presented in Equation 
                                                
6 We avoid presenting the derivative of M with respect to t to save space and avoid confusion. 
7 Deposit interest rate include withholding tax and fee whereas credit interest rate does not include banking and 
insurance transaction taxes (BIT) and resource utilization support fund (RUSF). We mean, BIT and RUSF was 
further taken from the user of credit.  
8 The intermediation cost variable is both affected by the magnitude of deposit and credit nominal interest rates. 
The withholding tax is a percentage of deposit interest rates and BIT and RUSF are calculated as a percentage of   8
(10) is displayed in Figure 1. Notice that, especially in the post 1999 period, the frequency in 
the change of the taxes and other burden increased.  
 
  *(1 ) t t t t t T WT F BIT RUSF = + + +   (10) 
 
In this equation, T denotes total taxes and other burdens on intermediation process while WT 
and F denote withholding tax and fees on deposit interest rate, respectively. These two are 
treated as a burden for the user of credit since an increase in the cost of deposit further 
increases the cost of credit for the private sector. This variable will be used as the right hand 
side explanatory variable in our regressions to indicate the extent of intermediation costs.  
 
5. Data and Empirical Application 
 
We use monthly data for the 1990 – 2004 period from Central Bank of Turkey. To utilize data 
for the empirical strategy we need to have a representation of model predictions. We believe 
that non – performing loans (NPL) is a good candidate for identifying risky projects therefore 
firms. We can represent this relationship as below,  
 
  1 ( ) t t NPL ω λ + =   (11) 
 
Our assumption implies ω`(λ)>0. Equation (11) describes a possible non – linear relationship 
between NPL and λ. An increase in risky projects leads to an increase in defaulted projects 
one period later. In this study we linearly approximate the relationship addressed in (11). 
Figure 3 displays the time series development of NPL in our sample period. It is a growing 
series and contains a unit root.
9  Notice that model prediction implies an increase in NPL due 
to an increase in the transaction costs. A simple regression of NPL on intermediation cost will 
lead to a bias estimate of the coefficient. The reason is the necessity to control for other 
developments that may lead to an increase in the NPL other than intermediation costs.  We 
believe that the spread between the credit cost and the deposit rate is a good proxy to serve as 
                                                                                                                                                   
credit market interest rates. On the other hand, reserve requirement is simply a percentage of the total deposit 
level, therefore affects the quantity and therefore price of credit. 
9  Augmented Dickey  Fuller  Test  is  used  with  optimal  lag-length selection  is  made  through (Ng  and  Perron 
2001). We do not display the results to save space.   9
a control variable.
10 We observe that especially in the post 2001 crisis period spreads decline 
significantly due to stabilization policies. 
 
The rate of return represented by spread will control for the changes in the pool of risky 
projects due to changes in interest rates. One problem with the simple difference between 
these two variables is that the deposit rate includes the withholding tax and fees.
11 We need to 
separate this cost from the deposit rate.
12 Figure 2 displays the spread between credit and 
deposit rates excluding these taxes. Moreover, according to the data, NPL inherits inertia and 
we have to include lag values of the dependent variable as explanatory variables.  
 
During the sample period Turkey observed three aggregate shocks. The first is the banking 
crisis of 1994, second is the global Asian crises and earthquake in Turkey corresponding to 
the  years  1998  and  1999,  respectively,  and  the  third  is  the  domestic  banking  crisis  in 
November  2000  and  February  2001.  To  control  for  these  shocks  we  believe  that  spread 
variable is sufficient due to its immediate reaction to crises. However, for robustness, we also 
conducted our regressions incorporating these shocks through with dummy variables, namely 
D94, D9899 and D0011. A plot of these dummy variables is presented on Figure 4.
13 We can 
                                                
10 Non-performing loans (NPL) move counter-cyclically with the business cycle. During growth (troughs) we see 
lower (higher) NPL ratios and vice. The extensive literature on the topic points out this empirical evidence from 
developed  economies  with  developed  financial  markets.  In  other  words,  this  relationship  is  observed  in  a 
financially  deep  market.  Turkey’s  credit  market  is  growing,  however,  very  shallow  compared  to  developed 
economies. In addition, the catch up process in credit ratios is still intact. This would suggest that during credit 
expansions,  and  GDP  growth  NPL  can  be  pro-cyclical,  therefore  would  lower  the  correlation  between  the 
business cycle and NPL. Moreover, especially in the post 2001 crisis period, the restructuring of public banks 
also contributed to the level of NPL’s where we still a continuous growth in the ratio of NPL to credit base till 
the  end  of  the  sample  period  (Figure  3).  This  could  sound  counter  intuitive,  but  during  a  recovery  from  a 
financial crisis it takes sometime to dissolve NPL’s. So in emerging economies like Turkey one would expect a 
weak correlation between GDP growth and NPL. For the sample period of 1990Q1 – 2004Q4, I calculated a 
correlation coefficient of 15 percent for these two variables. Still in the study, we used the Spread variable to 
control for the business cycle and other factors that may affect NPL’s. 
11  In  practice, intermediation  costs  on  credit is  added  on top  of  the announced  credit  rate whereas costs in 
deposits is already included in the deposit rate. 
12 (Ersel and Filiztekin 2004) investigate the relation between taxes on credit markets and credit demand in 
Turkish banking sector. The only analyzed the interaction between the cost of credit and credit demand since 
they argue the not much variation in intermediation costs. As can be observed from Figure 1 there is enough 
variation to test for the effect of the intermediation costs on non – performing loans. They revealed that credit 
market  is  not  work  properly  in  Turkey  due  to  the  high  macroeconomic  uncertainty  and  high  public  sector 
borrowing while they could not find significant relation between the cost of credit and demand for credit in 
Turkey.  They  finally  conclude  that  use  of  credit  from  banking  sector  is  a  financial  means  to  be  applied  in 
extreme conditions rather than an alternative financing source. 
13 During this period, 21 private banks were repatriated by Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The loans of 
these banks were firstly treated as non-performing loans. Later, these loans were restructured with the Istanbul 
Approach  which  is  the  legal  framework  aiming  at  ensuring  the  continuation  of  the  firms  that  are  in  credit 
agreement  by  defaulted  banks.  The  Istanbul  Approach  was  introduced  by  the  Banking  Regulation  and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA). In accordance with the “Financial Restructuring Framework Agreements” (FRFA) 
and through tying these agreements to “Financial Restructuring Contracts” within three years as from the date of   10
test this hypothesis with the following linear regression with the percentage change in the 
NPL’s as the endogenous variable. 
 
  1 1
1 1
I J
t t t i t j j t
i j
NPL c T NPL spread D u β α γ λ − − −
= =
= + + + + + ∑ ∑   (12)
14 
 
If the model is true the coefficient β has to be positive. Moreover, it will be unbiased. To 
jointly control for the crises we can assume both γ and λ’s to be both different from zero. 
Nevertheless, although these parameters are representing the sensitivity of the control variable 
we  expect  them  to  be  positive  since  a  shock to the economy must leave some financial 
contracts unfulfilled. To check for the individual control we either set γ or all λ’s to zero. The 
results are presented in Table 2. Columns two and three represent the latter case. As predicted 
by  the  model  we  find  a  positive  and  significant  β  coefficient.  Although  β  changes  in 
magnitude, it is still significant and positive in all regressions.  
 
The second implication of our model is the worsening of financial deepening with rising 
intermediation costs. In this analysis, our explanatory variable is the ratio of long – term 
foreign financing to total credit demand. We use annual data from Central Bank of Turkey for 
the 1991 – 2004 period. A quick look at Figure 5 addresses the increase in foreign financing 
as compared to domestic financing in the period of analysis. Therefore, we use the percentage 
change for this variable to prevent explosion. On the other hand, adding too many control 
variables  will  sacrifice  the  power  of  the  regression  since  we  have  only  14  observations. 
Therefore, we used a parsimonious representation by setting all λ’s to zero. Both domestic and 
foreign credits are in foreign currency terms however the ratio is label free.  
 
We regress the ratio of foreign to domestic financing to intermediation costs and the spread 
between the cost of domestic borrowing and LIBOR. Similar to Equation (12) we use spread 
as the control variable. LIBOR is used as a proxy for the cost of foreign financing. If the 
predictions of our model are true we expect the coefficient η to be positive since increasing 
costs of domestic financing through intermediation costs will lead to an increase for foreign 
                                                                                                                                                   
their approval by the BRSA, restructuring or rescheduling of bank receivables has become possible. Additional 
financing to debtors, if necessary, may also be provided under the approach (BRSA 2003). About 5 billion USD 
of non-performing loans was restructured with Istanbul Approach.  
14 We also looked into the interaction between the non-linear exogenous variables i.e. squared lag of NPL, and 
the dependant variable and we could not find a significant relationship.    11
financing.  The  results  are  presented  on  Table  3.  As  expected  the  coefficient  is  positive, 
however not significant, which is only a partial support to our model. The reasons can be 
twofold; first the model suggests that rates of return will be equal in the long run due to 
arbitrage, therefore it is the final cost to the borrower that is more relevant for demand for 
credit. The second is the lack of data and three aggregate shocks in the analysis period.  The 
first reason sounds more likely since we observe a high and significant coefficient for spread. 
The second will simply add to the power of the regression.  
 





η µ ε − −
  = + + +  
 
        (13) 
 
To analyze this issue further and check for robustness of our results. We ask the following 
question. If intermediation costs are more for domestic sources of credit, regardless of the 
currency that the contract is written, this will motivate both lenders and borrowers to foreign 
financing. In this respect, a simple ratio of credit supplied from foreign resources to foreign 
currency credit from domestic resources must be positively correlated with intermediation 
costs. A simple correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.32.
15  
 
All these results support the predictions of our model and indicates that exogenously created 
intermediation costs distorts markets and lead to an increase in the non – performing loan 
contracts that deteriorates the financial positions of the banks. This in turn results in greater 
financial fragility. In this setting optimal tax rate, in a partial equilibrium setting, for the 
government is zero, which will minimize the distortions on the financial sector.  
 
As indicated in the introduction the proposed increase in intermediation may/may not solve 
problems  created  by  the  current  account  deficit,  however  it  will  certainly  contributes  to 
greater financial fragility.  
 
                                                
15 We did not run the regression in (13) since the data for domestic foreign currency credit begins at 1996 we do 
not have too much degrees of freedom to run a robust regression.   12
6. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
Intermediation  is  costly  due  to  asymmetric  information  and  implies  greater  volatility  in 
business  cycle.  Government  policies  aiming  at  adding  to  these  costs  would  worsen  the 
financial position of both firms and banks. Our simple model is tested for the case of Turkey 
and received empirical support by the data.  
 
We believe that we answered two major questions that were absent in the empirical literature 
of financial fragility. One is the link between greater financial fragility and intermediation 
costs and the second is the shrinking domestic credit markets as a result of these distortions.  
 
For further research we need to address the treatment of reserve requirements of the Central 
Bank and its implications as an added cost in credit markets. In some sense it is relevant since 
these deposits at the Central Bank has an opportunity cost to the Banking sector and for a 
constant reserve multiplier leads to the contracting credit markets therefore increasing cost of 
credit. There are ways to deal with it in our setting, however is not within the scope of the 
paper, that only focuses on intermediation costs. 
   13
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Table 1: Tax Burden of Intermediation Process* 
Deposit Interest Rate  % 20.0 
Net Deposit Interest Rate to Savings Deposits Holders (Excluding withholding tax, 
Fund Tax and Special Transaction Tax)  
% 16.3 
Cost of Loans to Banks, (Reserve requirement, Liquidity, deposit insurance premium, 
BRSA Premium, Banking & Insurance Transaction Tax, Resource Utilization Support Fund 
(RUSF), Stamp Tax, Fees, etc. – under condition zero Profit of Banks and 3 percent of RUSF) 
% 25.5 
Cost of Loans to Banks, (Reserve requirement, Liquidity, deposit insurance premium, 
BRSA Premium, Banking & Insurance Transaction Tax, Resource Utilization Support Fund 
(RUSF), Stamp Tax, Fees, etc. – under the condition; zero profit for Banks and zero percent 
of RUSF) 
% 24.9 
Cost of tax and other burden due to intermediation (under the condition; 3 percent of 
RUSF) 
% 9.2 
Cost of tax and other burden due to intermediation (under the condition; 0 percent of 
RUSF) 
% 8.6 
       * Our calculations are based on Türkan et al. (2003).   15
Table 2 – Transaction Costs and Risky Projects  
Endogenous Variable: Percentage Change in NPLt 
  I  II  III 

















D94  0,077*** 
(0,015) 
  0,110*** 
(0,023) 
D9899  0,097*** 
(0,055) 
  0,111** 
(0,057) 
D0011  0,043*** 
(0,025) 
  0,057*** 
(0,024) 






# of Obs.  177  177  177 
* 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent significance levels. The numbers in parenthesis 
display standard deviation. 
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Table 3 – Financial Deepening (1991-2004) 
Endogenous Variable: Percentage Change in (FC/DC)t 
  (FC/DC)t 
C  -0,53 
(0,59) 
Tt  0,02 
(0,02) 
Spreadt  0,004** 
(0,002) 
# of Obs  14 
 
* 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent significance levels. The  
numbers in parenthesis display standard deviation. 
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*: Our calculations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Credit and Deposit Interest Difference 


















































































































* Our calculations   18
 




































































































































































                   Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
 
 















































































































D94: Domestic Crisis Dummy
D0011: Domestic Crisis Dummy
D9899: Global Crisis and Earthquake  Dummy
 
 
                   Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
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External Financing/Total Domestic Credit
External Financing/Foreign Currency Domestic Credit (Right Axis)
 